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AND LOYALTY1
Károly MiKe2
AbstrAct In Albert Hirschman’s theory, loyalty plays a key role in the equilibrium 
between exit and voice. This article extends economic (rational choice) analysis 
to the emergence of loyalty, which Hirschman considers an exogenous factor. 
This is accomplished by linking Williamson’s theory of specific investment to 
Hirschman’s model. Three cases are distinguished: (1) loyalty is due to specific 
investment; (2) loyalty is due to (intermediate) factors influenced by specific 
investment; and, (3) loyalty is independent of specific investment. A simple model 
formalizes the first case. A paradoxical dynamic of loyalty is identified: a lower 
degree of specificity may lead to a weakening of loyalty in the short run but a 
strengthening of loyalty in the long run. An application to the process of European 
integration is sketched.
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INTRODUCTION
Albert Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970) is beyond doubt a true 
classic of the social sciences. Its central thesis – that human relationships are 
supported by two fundamental mechanisms: exit and voice – is widely cited and 
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often used to structure thinking in economics, political science and sociology. 
However, Hirschman went beyond identifying the exit-voice dichotomy and 
proposed that the two mechanisms should and could be studied together. In 
fact, he added the concept of loyalty so as to explain the interaction between 
exit and voice. I think it is not unfair to say that Hirschman’s proposal has 
not generated a particularly fruitful research program. There have been very 
few formal elaborations of Hirschman’s numerous intuitions or the simple 
geometrical models presented in his book (Moses 2005, Gehlbach 2006, 
Lorz and Nastassine 2007). Empirical applications have been more numerous 
but also relatively limited, considering the fame of the original theory (e.g. 
Orbell – Uno 1972, Sharp 1984, Squire et al. 1987, Feld 1997, Dowding et 
al. 2000).
Hirschman himself suggested a reason for this failure by emphasizing “a 
stress on the possibility of unstable equilibria between exit and voice as one 
drives out the other and on the lack of once-and-for-all solutions through 
optimal mixes of exit and voice. In other words, the new approach does 
not satisfy our craving for equilibrium, harmony and final repose.” (1976: 
386). I believe that an additional explanation for the limited fruitfulness of 
Hirschman’s approach is a missing element in his theory. Hirschman stressed 
the role of loyalty in the interaction of exit and voice but left the emergence of 
loyalty unexplained. While he explained exit and voice as rational action, he 
discussed loyalty as an exogenous trait of unclear origin that may or may not 
characterize a group or an individual. In other words, loyalty remained outside 
the scope of economic (rational choice) analysis. By arguing that loyalty is 
the key to understanding the interaction between exit and voice but it is not 
amenable to economic analysis, Hirschman seemed to close down the avenue 
for future research that he had opened. I propose that Hirschman’s theory can 
be augmented and perhaps revitalized by extending rational choice analysis to 
the phenomenon of loyalty. My thesis is that that the concept of relationship-
specific (or idiosyncratic) investment is fundamental for understanding 
loyalty as rational action. Thus, Hirschman’s theory should be modified by 
borrowing the central concept from Oliver Williamson’s theory of transaction 
costs.
Like Hirschman, Williamson departed from the neoclassical view of the 
market which stresses the importance of competition and assumes that the key 
mechanism for dealing with underperforming economic partners is moving on 
to their rivals. Building on Coase’s (1937) insight, Williamson set out to explain 
the existence of hierarchical and other long-term economic relationships 
(1975, 1985). He introduced the notion of relationship-specific – or, as he 
prefers to call it, idiosyncratic – investment, which is investment that loses 
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a significant part of its value outside a given relationship. Such investments 
play a key role in transforming easy-to-exit, more or less impersonal contract-
based transactions into long-run, difficult-to-exit relationships whose 
functioning depends on internal governance mechanisms. In particular, 
unified or hierarchical governance is to be expected for recurring transactions 
characterized by uncertainty and highly idiosyncratic investments.
In a brief exchange, Hirschman and Williamson themselves noted that their 
theories share some basic ideas. Of particular interest to us is Hirschman’s 
remark that “hierarchy can be considered as a special variety of institutionalized 
voice” (1976: 386-7). Williamson agreed by stating that “both EVL [Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty] and MH [Markets and Hierarchies] feature the use of 
market alternatives to autonomous contracting in which voice is prominent” 
(1976: 373). Having recognized the co-existence of voice and exit mechanisms 
in the economy and other social fields, both authors attempted to identify 
the circumstances under which exit or voice is likely to emerge. Hirschman 
argued that a fundamentally important circumstance is the presence of loyalty, 
whereas Williamson pointed to the importance of idiosyncratic investments. 
All the more surprising that the authors did not reflect upon the possible 
correspondence between the two concepts.3  I propose that Williamson was 
more successful in unearthing the microanalytics of why people may choose 
to stay in relationships and try to influence them from within, rather than leave 
them. In fact, he identified a rational choice explanation for the emergence of 
loyalty; the undertaking of relationship-specific investment. This explanation 
can be transferred to Hirschman’s more general exit-voice framework. By 
linking the two theories, loyalty can be brought (at least partially) within the 
ambit of rational choice explanation. At the same time, Williamson’s concept 
is proven to be relevant for all types of human cooperation, regardless of the 
specific mechanisms of governance.
After briefly summarizing Hirschman’s theory and Williamson’ concept 
of relationship-specific investment, I integrate the latter into Hirschman’s 
framework through his concept of loyalty. Three cases are distinguished: (1) 
loyalty is due to specific investment; (2) loyalty is due to (intermediate) factors 
influenced by specific investment; and, (3) loyalty is independent of specific 
investment. In the first case, the concept of loyalty can basically be replaced 
in Hirschman’s model by the concept of specific investment. An advantage 
of this replacement is that decisions about specific investment and specific 
assets are usually easier to identify and explain as responses to factors in the 
social environment than loyalty per se. 
3 To the author’s  knowledge, this has not yet changed . See, for example, Hirschman 2008.
58 KÁROLY MIKE
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2012) 
Although loyalty seems to be especially prevalent in relationships where 
investments tend to be highly idiosyncratic, the multi-faceted phenomenon 
of loyalty cannot simply be reduced to the concept of specific investment. 
However, the presence of specific investments can make the emergence of 
loyalty more likely even in cases when loyalty is not a direct consequence of 
specific investment (case 2). To explain how, I must look beyond economics 
to social psychology and moral philosophy. Finally, loyalty may emerge even 
in the absence of specific investments. This is an acknowledgement of the 
limits of the approach proposed here. No doubt loyalty may sometimes be 
beyond economic analysis.
If elements in the social environment that affect specific investment 
decisions can be identified, the emergence and persistence of loyalty can be 
explained. In the second part of this article I focus on the case where loyalty is 
due to specific investment. I construct a simple model to explore how changes 
in external circumstances may affect specific investments (and therefore 
loyalty), and ultimately exit and voice. I envisage a situation where the 
transferability of investments changes due to an external factor. A paradoxical 
dynamic of loyalty is identified: a lower degree of specificity may lead to a 
weakening of loyalty in the short run but a strengthening of loyalty in the long 
run. I conclude by sketching an empirical application of the model.
2. A SUMMARY OF HIRSCHMAN’S THEORY
Hirschman was led by his analysis of firm-customer and intra-organizational 
relationships to identify two fundamental preference revealing and incentive 
mechanisms: exit and voice. Exit corresponds to market behaviour as 
perceived by neoclassical economics: market actors always choose their most 
preferred alternative, and if they become dissatisfied with a good, a service or 
a contractual relationship, they will opt for another. Hirschman’s innovation 
was to draw the attention of economists to the fact that exit is not the only 
mechanism of preference revelation and incentive giving. A consumer or a 
member of an organization may be able to improve their welfare by changing 
an existing relationship from within rather than leaving it. A customer may 
call a producer with their complaint, subordinates may ask their superiors 
to improve their work, etc. Such methods of expressing dissatisfaction are 
labeled ‘voice’ because, unlike exit, they usually involve communication 
between the affected parties.
As Hirschman amply illustrates (1978, 2008), the categories of exit and 
voice have relevance beyond consumer markets and economic organizations. 
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People who wish to cooperate can more or less always choose between these 
two mechanisms. We often try to improve our personal relationships, civil 
associations or political communities ‘from within’. Except for extreme 
situations, we can also quit these relationships. Exit is the most common 
strategy in some relationships, while voice prevails in others. Hirschman 
argues that a fundamental difference between politics and the economy is that 
the former is mainly characterized by voice, while exit dominates the latter. 
However, he emphasizes that both mechanisms are present in both spheres 
and their joint analysis will provide a better understanding of both.
The parallel consideration of exit and voice led Hirschman to the concept 
of loyalty. Exit and voice may be substitutes or complements. They are 
substitutes inasmuch as exit opportunities may make voice less attractive. 
They are complements inasmuch as the exit option strengthens the bargaining 
power of an individual who raises his voice. If exit is absolutely impossible, 
voice may not be seriously considered since it is not backed up by the threat of 
leaving the group. By contrast, if there are plenty of alternative relationships 
to choose from, no-one may bother to engage in costly voice activities. This 
may explain, for example, why a totalitarian party as well as small parties in a 
multiparty system may be less sensitive to internal criticism than large parties 
in a two-party democracy.
Hirschman identifies loyalty as a type or trait: ‘loyal’ people suffer some 
sort of psychic cost – a ‘cost of disloyalty’ (1970: 136) – when they quit a 
group or relationship. According to this definition, loyalty raises the cost of 
exit. As a consequence, it increases the probability of voice but diminishes 
the bargaining power of those who engage in voice. Very strong loyalty is 
undesirable because it prevents group members from even considering the 
option of exit and robs them of internal bargaining power. An intermediate 
level of loyalty may, however, facilitate a healthy equilibrium between exit 
and voice by creating a situation in which ‘there should be the possibility of 
exit, but exit should not be too easy or too attractive as soon as deterioration 
of one’s own organization sets in’ (83). In a nation state, for example, a 
restrained form of patriotism may be desirable.
Hirschman argues that loyalty is socially useful if exit threatens to undermine 
voice that is efficient from the group’s perspective (i.e. it would increase the 
group’s welfare). This threat is gravest if those who are likely to leave first 
can raise their voices most effectively.
Hirschman also identifies another aspect of loyal behaviour. Some loyal 
people tend to participate in action aimed at changing the activities or goals 
of their group, while others are simply unwilling to exit and suffer in silence. 
That is, loyalty has two ‘components’: the passive component is always 
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there, and it may (or may not) be accompanied by the active component.4 
Loyalty is usually more than a mere reluctance to leave a relationship. It 
refers to a positive commitment to improving the welfare of other parties in a 
relationship (Barry 1974). The active component of loyalty may reinforce the 
favourable effect of (moderate) passive loyalty on the equilibrium between 
exit and voice. While passive loyalty functions as an ‘exit tax’, active loyalty 
can be interpreted as a ‘voice subsidy’ (Gehlbach 2006).
3. RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC INVESTMENT 
AS A CAUSE OF LOYALTY
Hirschman stops short of explaining where and why loyalty emerges and 
what influences its strength. So the criticism that loyalty serves as an ‘ad hoc 
equation filler’ in his theory has merit (Barry 1974). To include loyalty into 
economic analysis, loyalty must be grasped as rational behaviour. Individual 
decisions that accompany the emergence and survival of loyalty must be 
identified. For this purpose, I define loyalty as perseverance in a relationship 
in spite of difficulties, which may be accompanied by a willingness to 
act in order to improve the relationship from within. This is in line with 
Hirschman’s idea that loyalty functions as an ‘exit tax’ and occasionally 
also as a ‘voice subsidy’. However, I move beyond assuming that loyalty is 
merely a behavioral type and bring economic analysis into the examination of 
decisions that underlie loyalty.
3.1. Relationship-specific investments
An idiosyncratic or relationship-specific investment creates a (specific) 
asset which has higher value in a given relationship than in the best alternative 
relationship. That is, it loses some of its value outside the relationship 
(Milgrom – Roberts 2005).5 For our purposes, specific investments in human 
capital have special importance. Learning and cooperative experience in 
a relationship often lead to the accumulation of specific human assets. 
Indeed, economic theories of human capital tend to stress the role of specific 
4 The distinction is suggested by Balázs (1997), although with a somewhat different meaning.
5  An investment may be specific to a transaction rather than the parties to a transaction, who may 
change. For eaxmple, human capital might be specific to a machine, no matter who owns that 
machine. I ignore this complication here.
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knowledge in economic relationships. Human capital is usually defined as 
income-generating capacity (Rosen 1987). However, the concept can be 
defined more broadly as capacity to engage in productive cooperation. The 
deepest and most general cause of the specific nature of human capital is 
man’s limited cognitive capacity, which makes his knowledge highly context-
specific. The concept of bounded rationality may be helpful here. As Herbert 
Simon puts it:
“the bounded rationality of humans does not allow us to grasp the 
complex situations that provide the environments for our actions in 
their entirety. The first step in rational action is to focus attention on 
specific (strategic) aspects of the total situation… One dimension 
of simplification is to focus on particular goals, and one form of 
focus is to attend to the goals of an organization or organizational 
unit” (1991: 37). 
Bounded rationality ties our knowledge to our own situation and limits it to 
our closer environment. This is especially so when dispersed, practical, time 
and space specific forms of knowledge are needed (Hayek 1995), as opposed 
to abstract, scientific knowledge.
The economic role of this type of knowledge was explained by Alchian 
(1984) in discussing team production. Technical advantages are not the only 
explanation why teamwork is more productive than individual work. In fact, 
the value of a successful group partly derives from the value of creating a 
successful group. The source of cooperative surplus is the group members’ 
specific investment in getting to know each other and establishing methods 
of cooperation. This may sound tautological, since cooperation is impossible 
without acquaintance or some modus vivendi. In fact, what I want to argue is 
that learning about and cooperating with a person or a group always creates 
human capital that is to some degree relationship-specific. The more the result 
of learning or the method of cooperation is tied to a person or a group, the 
greater the degree of specificity.
In the economy, highly idiosyncratic investments tend to characterize 
long-term relationships, especially organizations (Williamson 2007, Hart 
2006). Beyond the economy, specific investments appear in close personal 
relationships, such as with families and friendships. The more personal a 
relationship, the greater the investments that are specific to it. Ben-Porath 
(1980) notes the following: “The most important characteristic of the family 
contract is that it is embedded in the identity of the partners, without which it 
loses its meaning. It is thus specific and nonnegotiable or non-transferable.” 
(3-4).
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Specific investments are also very important for political communities. As 
Furubotn and Richter (1998: 415) explain (while discussing North’s (1981) 
‘neoclassical theory of the state’):
“Citizens of a country usually make much more significant specific 
investments than, for example, employees of a relationship. They 
are born and grow up in a country. Their sunk costs include their 
years of youth spent in their country, while they learn its language, 
formal and informal rules of behaviour, religion, culture, etc. 
Moreover, specific investments include resources spent on family, 
friends and business relationships.” 
3.2. The effect of specific investments on exit and voice
Williamson (1975) introduced the concept of idiosyncratic investment 
into economic theory in order to grasp the logic of durable long-term 
relationships. A specific investment makes it profitable for parties to hold on 
to their relationships even in the midst of unexpected, unfavorable changes. 
Such an investment ‘locks in’ the parties in the relationship. It is therefore 
straightforward to identify specific investment as an important cause of 
loyalty; i.e. perseverance in a relationship. The literature following Hirschman 
introduced the intuition that “the degree of loyalty that one has depends 
upon… the amount one has invested in that object” (Dowding et al. 2000: 
477). The examples of investment discussed include resources invested by 
employees that are directly related to their jobs (e.g. length of employment, 
work efforts, non-transferable training experience) or which are workplace-
specific in other ways (e.g. having a home near one’s workplace, adopting 
travelling solutions, workplace friends, making payments into corporate 
pension funds – as in Farrell – Rusbult 1992; ‘investing’ into local schools 
by sending one’s children there – as in Dowding – John 2007). However, 
these authors do not generalize these examples or follow up their intuitions 
using theory. I think the primary reason for this failure is that they do not 
use the concept of relationship-specific investment. The rather narrow field 
of management science which deals with customer satisfaction and loyalty 
has gone one step further by identifying ‘consumers’ irreplaceable asset 
generated from past transactions’ as having ‘strong effects on their loyalty 
responses’ (Chiou – Pan 2009: 327 – emphasis added). However, no attempt 
was made to theorise the mechanism.
In fact, relationship-specific investments have exactly the same effects 
on exit and voice decisions as loyalty, according to Hirschman. First, such 
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an investment increases the value of the existing relationship relative to 
alternatives. Thus, the relative price of exit increases compared to staying, 
as if there were an ‘exit tax’. The investment also induces more voice: it 
increases the potential value of the relationship so the stake is greater. Second, 
some specific investments raise the value of the relationship by increasing 
the effectiveness of voice mechanisms. Like active loyalty, they provide a 
‘subsidy’ to voice.
It is worth clarifying how specific investment and voice relate to one another. 
Voice efforts are themselves a special category of specific investments since 
they bring benefits only within the relationship. Nevertheless, it seems 
sensible to distinguish between activities that are directly aimed at improving 
a relationship and other investments that increase its value. Decisions about 
the former and the latter can usually be distinguished and analysed separately. 
Like Hirschman, I shall continue calling the former ‘voice’ and restrict the use 
of the term ‘specific investment’ to the latter.
Some specific investments in this restricted sense may work through 
voice. Others increase the value of the relationship independently of voice; 
i.e. even if the investor remains passive. Therefore, following the distinction 
between active and passive loyalty, one can distinguish between voice-
related and voice-independent specific investments. An example of voice-
related investment is the establishment of a bilateral governance structure that 
facilitates cooperation between two firms (Williamson 1979). An example of 
voice-independent specific investment may be a supplier’s relocation closer 
to one manufacturer and farther away from the latter’s rivals. This example 
suggests, however, that specific investments are probably never completely 
voice-independent. Geographical proximity may, for example, diminish 
communication costs within the relationship. Nevertheless, from the exit-
voice perspective it is useful to distinguish between the two ideal types.
3.3. The complex relationship between  
specific investments and loyalty
The discussion so far raises the question whether the concept of loyalty 
could not simply be ‘replaced’ by relationship-specific investment in 
Hirschman’s theoretical framework. Such a replacement may seem further 
justified by the observation that specific investment is a regular feature of 
those relationships where loyalty is typically expected. In the economy, loyalty 
is usually associated with organizations. One of Hirschman’s key examples is 
‘organizational loyalty’. Simon (1991) compares organizations and markets 
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and clearly associates loyalty with the former. As noted, Williamson invented 
the concept of idiosyncratic investment with the very purpose of explaining 
hierarchical governance, which he thought was the defining feature of modern 
economic organizations. Outside the economy, loyalty is typically associated 
with intense personal relationships and political communities; i.e. those social 
relations that are characterized by highly specific investments.
However, it would be wrong to equate the presence of specific investment 
with loyalty, i.e. perseverance in a group or relationship, The two concepts 
relate to each other in more complex and more interesting ways. Loyalty has 
other rational aspects beyond the undertaking of specific investments, which 
must be examined. Several rational decisions can be identified that play a role 
in the establishment and preservation of loyalty.
Hirschman made a few scattered remarks about the origins of loyalty. I 
shall first discuss these and then go on to analyse other rational decisions that 
may underlie loyalty. By drawing on economics, social psychology and moral 
philosophy, I shall show that all of these decisions are, to some extent, linked 
to specific investments.
Hirschman states that loyalty can be explained by “less rational, though 
far from wholly irrational” factors (38). At several points, he suggests that 
the irrational component dominates. He emphasizes that loyalty is especially 
important when voice activities require time, effort and innovativeness. If this 
is so, then loyalty is needed precisely when it is irrational from the individual’s 
perspective. Moreover, he calls loyalty a special form of attachment; i.e. an 
unreflected emotion.
Emotions. Without doubt, emotional attachment often accompanies 
loyalty. It is questionable, however, that non-rational attachment plays such 
an important role in securing loyalty as presumed by Hirschman. As Balázs 
(1997) points out, in the absence of rational thinking, emotions are more 
easily extinguished. The test of loyalty is persistence in a crisis, which is 
more securely supported by a will that can partly rely on rational arguments 
than by ‘blind loyalty’. Perseverance often requires the suppression of 
instinctive emotions (Royce 1908). In fact, there is some contradiction 
between Hirschman’s claim that moderate loyalty is socially desirable and his 
statement that loyalty is individually irrational when it is really needed. It is 
unclear how an irrational emotion can be moderated. There are two ways out 
of this contradiction. First, rational decisions are just as important components 
of loyalty as emotions. Second, emotions associated with loyalty may not be 
entirely devoid of rationality.
As far as the rationality of emotions is concerned, perhaps it is not 
inappropriate to speak of an ‘economy of emotions’. One can nurture friendly 
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emotions only towards a small number of people (as was noted by Adam 
Smith). One must therefore ‘specialise’ one’s friendly emotions within a few 
relationships. Similarly, one must choose among friendly, erotic, patriotic 
and other emotions. For example, the emotional aspect of friendship can 
be perceived as the investment of one’s ‘emotional capital’ which brings an 
‘emotional benefit’ mainly in one relationship.
Trust. As far as the non-emotional, rational aspects of loyalty are 
concerned, I shall first consider what Hirschman considered the (only?) 
rational component of loyalty. He emphasized that a loyal person has trust in a 
relationship and is optimistic about its future. Loyal members of a group often 
believe that they are able to influence the functioning of the group. Should 
they not have significant influence, they still expect that “someone will act 
or something will happen to improve matters” (78). Otherwise, loyalty is 
unlikely to survive. These two types of trust – the first based on a belief in 
one’s own capabilities, the other on a belief in others’ actions – correspond 
clearly to active and passive loyalty, respectively.
Trust within limits may be rational if it is based on past experience. 
As explained above, acquaintance with another person and cooperative 
experience are specific assets. The decision to trust may be rational even in 
the absence of such assets if a relationship can be maintained in the long 
run. Simulations of repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemmas (e.g. Axelrod 
1984, Vanberg – Congleton 1992) prove that ‘prudent moral’ strategies that 
combine initial trust and subsequent reciprocity provide higher payoffs than 
opportunism in a variety of circumstances. Hence, it may pay to offer trust at 
the beginning of a relationship and cooperate even in the absence of positive 
past experience. However, this assumes that it is a reasonable expectation 
that the relationship will continue. The likelihood of continuation is greater 
if there are specific investments which induce the parties to remain in the 
relationship.
Besides the decision to trust, there are other important rational decisions 
that should be included in a comprehensive explanation of loyalty (Ewin 
1992). If I hold on to a relationship in a crisis because I trust (based on my 
past experience or future expectations) that better times will come, I act like 
a prudent investor. Loyalty beyond such calculating behaviour (i.e. staying 
even if I expect further deterioration or personal suffering) is not necessarily 
irrational, however.
Morality. What can make such behaviour rational? The answer is partly 
suggested by the etymology of the word loyalty. Its Latin root is lex, i.e. law. 
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The reason for my loyalty to you may be that I owe you something or have an 
obligation to you. My obligation may result from my own promise, an action 
of yours in the past which calls for consideration, a moral law (e.g. between 
a parent and a child) or simply gratitude (Ewin 1992). It is rational to fulfil 
a moral obligation if its violation (i) activates social sanctions (e.g. loss of 
reputation or ostracism), or (ii) feelings of guilt which serve as internalised 
sanctions (Ellickson 1991). Thus, social or internal sanctions may explain 
loyalty even in the absence of trust. Both passive and active forms of loyalty 
can be explained in this way: I may feel obliged either simply to persist in a 
relationship or to contribute actively to its improvement.
What is the relationship between morality and specific investments? The 
moral obligations I take upon myself may (and perhaps should) be influenced 
by my ability to help others. This ability, in turn, depends on my knowledge of 
the other person and our shared experience, i.e. specific investment.
Identity. Identity is another concept which many social scientists and 
philosophers associate with loyalty. People’s self-perception or identity is 
partly shaped by the social groups to which they belong. Internalization of 
group membership changes motivations and often leads to behaviour which 
contradicts narrow self-interest. The welfare of those who identify with a 
group is linked to the welfare of the group (Van Vugt – Hart 2004: 586). If 
group members consider the likely effects of their behaviour on their group 
mates, they may choose to stay (and perhaps raise their voice) even when 
their narrower self-interest would dictate otherwise. Moreover, identity 
may influence the range of people towards whom we feel morally obliged 
(Oldenquist 1982). So identification may also have an indirect effect on loyalty 
by linking one’s sense of justice or gratitude to a group or relationship.
Identification with a social group always presumes to some extent 
acquaintance with the group, which is a specific investment. In fact, the noted 
link between identity and moral obligations is perhaps best explained and 
justified by the fact the specific investments may increase the effectiveness of 
our moral endeavors.
Stability of choices. Comte-Sponville (1998) argues in his treatise on 
virtues that all forms of loyalty, or as he puts it, fidelity, are ultimately based 
on one’s fidelity to oneself: one’s previous thoughts and intentions. If I do 
not have a record of a certain past and do not accept it as mine, I cease to be 
a consistent actor and moral subject. “Fidelity is the virtue of the Same, by 
which the Same exists or survives” (32). In the more mundane language of 
economics, fidelity is the constancy of preferences.
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Economists usually ignore the possibility that preferences might change 
due to methodological reasons. If they acknowledge it, they seek to explain 
concrete and well-defined changes in preferences (Becker – Stigler 1989). The 
problem of changeability itself is hardly ever discussed.6 Economics implicitly 
assumes that the task of preserving one’s self-identity is accomplished 
successfully. By contrast, if the starting point for analysis is the assumption 
of changeable preferences, ‘loyalty’ can be identified as a special personal 
type: one with a stable preference ordering. This concept of loyalty is in line 
with Hirschman’s theory. If an individual previously chose relationship A 
rather than relationship B, they are, ceteris paribus, more likely to persist in 
relationship A if their preference ordering is stable rather than changeable, and 
the preference relation between A and B reverses with a positive probability.
Loyalty to oneself may be a matter of personal disposition but is also, to some 
extent, a matter of rational choice. Rational decisions which increase one’s 
self-loyalty include (i) a conscious suppression of weakness of will (see Elster 
1979), and (ii) gathering and digesting information to provide better and more 
secure foundations for our evaluations. The latter is again a form of specific 
investment. For example, if an alternative (not yet examined) relationship 
becomes available, the leaving of an existing relationship for this new one 
requires at least some investment in gathering additional information about 
the new alternative. In other words, the previous investment in information 
about the existing relationship loses some of its value.
To summarize our findings, loyalty may be based on emotional attachment 
and trust as well as moral motives, identification with a group and the 
constancy of preferences. I have argued that specific investments can be 
linked to each of these factors of loyalty. Although these factors do not 
presuppose specific investments, they would be rather weak in their absence. 
Acquaintance with the other parties in a relationship and the accumulation of 
cooperative experience are especially important. 
It should also be noted that large specific investments do not automatically 
lead to loyalty through these intermediate factors. Investments that are specific 
to a marriage, a business relationship or a country may be accompanied 
by different degrees of trust, morality, identity or preference stability. It is 
perhaps most appropriate to say that specific investments create a favorable 
environment for the emergence of loyalty, or increase the probability of loyal 
6  A couple of exceptions who at least raise the issue are Hahn (1996) and Skog (2000). In 
political science, the volatility of electoral preferences is a much discussed topic. See Huckfeldt 
(1983).
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behaviour. If a relationship is characterized by highly specific investments, 
parties: (i) have a more secure base on which to fund their trust; are more 
likely to obtain specific knowledge and experience which; (ii) helps them 
identify with others in the relationship; (iii) makes their moral commitment 
reasonable; (iv) explains their emotional attachment; and, (v) mitigates the 
volatility of their choices. By contrast, if the presence of specific investment 
is negligible (e.g. because the role of non-transferable information and 
experience is negligible) then the ease of exit weakens the incentives to trust, 
reduces the likelihood of identification, casts doubt on the reasonability of 
focusing moral obligations on the relationship and weakens steadfastness in 
one’s choices.
In sum, three analytical cases can be distinguished: (1) loyalty is the result 
of specific investment; (2) loyalty is the result of one or several (intermediate) 
factors which are strengthened by specific investments; and (3) loyalty 
emerges independently of specific investments. In reality, loyalty of course 
tends to be a mixture of these analytically clear cases. To put it differently, 
loyalty may be explained partly by specific investments, partly by other factors 
strengthened by specific investments and it may also have a component which 
cannot be explained in this way.
Finally, this discussion of specific investments and loyalty would not be 
complete if I did not mention the possibility of an inverse relationship between 
the two concepts. A specific investment requires a ‘contractual guarantee’ 
which protects the investor against the other party’s efforts to appropriate 
the return (or quasi-rent) from the investment. Loyalty (not founded on the 
specific investment in question) may serve as such a guarantee. A contracting 
party’s ability to appropriate (or his bargaining power) depends on the size 
of loss they would suffer upon leaving the relationship. Loyalty as an ‘exit 
tax’ increases this loss and weakens the party’s bargaining power. Of course, 
there may be other guarantees than loyalty. So loyalty is not a prerequisite for 
specific investment (at least theoretically).
4. HOW DOES A CHANGE IN INVESTMENT SPECIFICITY 
AFFECT EXIT AND VOICE? A FORMAL MODEL
Among the three cases distinguished above, ‘loyalty as a result of specific 
investment’ represents the analytically simplest case. If the sole explanation 
for loyalty, i.e. perseverance in a relationship, is the presence of specific 
investment, loyalty can be practically replaced by specific investment as 
an equilibrator of exit and voice in Hirschman model. The main advantage 
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of this replacement is that it makes room for an analysis of the emergence 
and strength of loyalty. I present a simple model to illustrate how changes 
in the social environment may affect decisions about specific investments 
and ultimately exit and voice. More concretely, I assume that relationships 
become more similar and, as a result, investments become less specific. One 
could think of several real-world applications: (i) productive technologies 
used by different firms become more standardized so human capital becomes 
less firm-specific; (ii) smaller communities in a society become culturally 
more homogeneous; or, (iii) it becomes easier for potential business partners 
to establish contact with each other (e.g. information technologies or travel 
conditions improve), etc. I will elaborate on only one application: European 
integration makes national political communities more homogeneous and 
therefore investments by citizens become less country-specific.
I assume that an individual who participates in a relationship can make 
two types of relationship-specific investment. One type is voice-related – 
it increases the value of the relationship by facilitating voice. It raises the 
benefit from any given voice effort. The other type is voice-independent – 
its positive effect on the value of the relationship is independent of voice. 
The assumption that both types of investment are present makes room for the 
analysis of both as well as their interaction. I distinguish between the short 
run and the long run. In the short run, investment levels are fixed. They are the 
consequences of past investment decisions which were taken when the change 
in specificity was not yet foreseeable. In the long run, investment levels can 
be re-optimized in response to changes in specificity. First, I explore how 
changes in specificity affect exit and voice decisions in the short run when 
investment levels are fixed.
4.1. Short-run adjustments
(i) Assume that the levels of voice-related investment (I) and voice-
independent investment (Y) are given. (ii) The investor learns about the 
usefulness of investments in the existing relationship ( bIIR a +=)( , bIIR
a +=)( ), 
and the best alternative relationship ( bIIR a +=)( , bIIR a +=)( ). (iii) The investor 
then decides whether to exit or stay in the existing relationship. (iv) Finally, 
they decide about their voice effort in the chosen relationship. 
When the individual makes the exit/stay decision, they weigh the return 
of their investments in both relationships as well as the level of welfare they 
can enjoy in each relationship irrespective of their investments. Assume that 
these welfare levels are stochastic variables, and the individual learns about 
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their values just before they make the exit/stay decision. By this assumption, 
investment levels influence the probability of exit. (This assumption is useful 
because, as we shall see, it provides a common framework for analyzing 
short-term and long-term effects.)
The individual’s short-run optimization problem can be solved by backward 
induction. The optimal voice effort (v) in any relationship is:
(1) 
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where NB is the net benefit from voice, B is the gross benefit from voice, and C is the cost of 
voice. Assume that the cost of voice is an upward-sloping and convex function of the voice 
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Second, consider the case when voice-independent investment becomes less 
specific. Equation (5) above shows that if  
j
Is  increases, the probability of 
exit increases too. Since the usefulness of the voice-independent investment 
in the existing relationship does not change, voice effort (v) will remain the 
same if the individual chooses to stay. 
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Summary of short-run effects
In the short run, if the usefulness of either type of investment in the alternative 
relationship increases, the consequences are the same. As existing investments 
become less specific, the individual (i) will have a stronger incentive to exit but 
(ii) will not change their voice effort if they choose to stay.
4.2. Long-run adjustments 
 
Voice-related investment becomes less specific
Now assume that the individual foresees that the specificity of their 
investments will decrease and adjusts their investment levels accordingly. 
First, consider the case when their voice-related investment becomes more 
useful in the alternative relationship (while the usefulness of voice-independent 
investment does not change).
The change in specificity now affects not only the probability of exit and 
the voice effort but also the level of investments. The individual chooses the 
values of I and Y when they already foresee (correctly) their usefulness in 
the two relationships. To keep the analysis simple, I assume that the degree 
of usefulness of each investment type in the existing relationship is one: 
bIIR a +=)( . This means that the individual can adjust the composition of 
their investment to changes within the existing relationship so that its return 
remains the same. For example, the assumption is valid if homogenization 
does not affect the cost of gathering information that helps the successful 
management of a relationship, although the composition of information needed 
may change. Since bIIR
a +=)( , the notations for the alternative relationship 
can be simplified: aYY ss ≡ , and 
a
YY ss ≡ .
Primary effects
First, consider how the optimal level of voice-related investment, I is 
affected by an increase in its external usefulness, Is . The mechanism is 
somewhat complicated even in this simple model. To separate the various 
effects, I first assume that the level of voice-independent investment is fixed. 
Later on, I will lift this restriction and allow Y to respond. The optimal level 
of I is given by:
(6) 
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where 
where ])()()()(Pr[Pr ηζ −<−+−= YsWYWIsRIR YIexit  is the probability of exit, while )(ηE
and )(ζE  are the conditional expected values of welfare levels. 
The first-order condition is: 
 (7) 
1)]()()()()()([
Pr
)('Pr)(')Pr1( =−+−+−
∂
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++−= ηζ EEIRIsRYWYsW
I
IsRsIRFOC IY
exit
IIexitexit
I
            I.       II.               III. 
↓ 0 ↑ ↑ ?                   ↑
Component I represents the return on the investment if the individual stays. Component II 
represents the return if the individual exits. Components III reflects that the level of 
investment influences the probability of exit. The reason for this is that a change in I leads to a 
change in the difference between the two returns, )()( IsRIR I− , which in turn alters the 
attractiveness of the exit option. 
The first-order condition helps to track the effects of a higher Is  on optimal I. As we have 
seen, in the short run a higher Is  (i.e. improved utility in the alternative relationship) 
increases the probability of exit. This effect is also present in the long run, provided that the 
return on the investment does not fall too rapidly as I increases: )(')(' IsRsIR II>  (this 
condition is satisfied if, for example, bIIR a +=)( , where 10 ≤≤ a .) In such a case, )Pr1( exit−
decreases in the first component, while exitPr  increases in the second component (the arrows 
below the first order condition signal the effects of 0>Δs  on the respective components for 
any fixed level of I.) This implies that the investor chooses with greater probability the 
relationship in which part of the return will be lost. As a consequence, they are better off 
reducing their investment level in the long run. 
At the same time, a higher Is  implies that the individual’s investment becomes more relevant 
for a broader range of relationships. The overall expected return on investment increases. 
Therefore, they are better off increasing the level of investment. The second factor in 
component II of the first-order condition reflects this: unless the return falls rapidly as 
investment increases,7 the expression )(' IsRs II  rises with Is .
Finally, the third component shows that a comprehensive analysis ought to consider one more 
effect: the value of Is  which influences how the level of investment affects the probability of 
exit. However, the sign of the influence is uncertain: 
I
exit
sI∂∂
∂ Pr2
 may be either positive or 
negative.
There is no general answer as to how the optimal level of voice-related investment is affected 
by an increase in its external usefulness. The sign of the effect depends on the shape of the 
return function and the probability distribution of the difference between the welfare levels in 
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Finally, the third component shows that a comprehensive analysis ought to 
consider one more effect: the value of s
I
 which influences how the level of 
investment affects the probability of exit. However, the sign of the influence 
is uncertain:
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level of investment will increase. Let’s focus on the first two mechanisms (the 
first two components in the first-order condition) and ignore the third one, 
whose effect is very uncertain and probably relatively weak, anyway. The first 
and second effects have opposite signs so their joint effect may be positive 
or negative. In ordinary circumstances, the first effect is likely to dominate, 
however. An improvement in external usefulness is unlikely to increase the 
probability of exit to such an extent that it would be worth reducing the level 
of investment.
The second question of interest is whether exit becomes more or less 
probable. The probability of exit when the level of investment is at an optimum 
I = I* is as follows:
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On the one hand, the improved external usefulness of the investment makes the exit option 
more valuable, as in the short run ( 0)(' ** <− IIsR I ). On the other hand, it may encourage 
increased investment (if 
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0 ). If investment is higher, a greater absolute value of return is 
lost as the individual exits.8 Therefore, the first effect which induces exit is augmented by a 
second effect which induces the individual to stay. Ultimately, the second effect will dominate 
and the probability of exit will fall if 
s
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0  is sufficiently high. Otherwise, the sign of the 
short-run effect (but not its strength) will remain the same in the long run: the probability of 
exit will increase. 
Secondary effects 
How does this result change if Y is allowed to respond to a higher external usefulness of I in 
the long run? The optimization problem is now the following: 
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Therefore, the first effect which induces exit is augmented by a second 
effect which induces the individual to stay. Ultimately, the second effect will 
dominate and the probability of exit will fall if
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 is sufficiently high. Otherwise, the sign of the short-run effect (but 
not its strength) will remain the same in the long run: the probability of exit 
will increase.
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The second condition clarifies how a decrease in the specificity of 
voice-related investment indirectly affects the level of voice-independent 
investment. The effect is mediated by the probability of exit, which changes 
with s
I
 and I. Let’s assume again that the first two components of the first-
order condition dominate and the third effect can be ignored.9 If the probability 
of exit increases as a primary consequence of Ys∆ , the expected return on Y 
falls. Consequently, its optimal level will fall, too (since )(')(' YsWsYW YY>  
can reasonably be assumed to hold). By contrast, if the probability of exit 
9  Again, the effect of s
I
 and I through the third component is unclear because )]()([
** IsRIR I−∆  
is difficult to sign, as we have seen.
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decreases, the expected return on Y as well as it optimal level will increase.
How does a change in the optimal level of Y as a secondary effect modify 
the probability of exit and the voice effort? On the one hand, it is easy to see 
that it reinforces the primary effect on the probability of exit. If exit becomes 
more likely, optimal Y falls, which makes exit even more likely. By contrast, if 
exit becomes less likely, optimal Y increases, which strengthens the incentive 
to stay. The secondary effect on voice effort is more complicated. If optimal 
Y increases, the option to stay becomes more attractive, which increases the 
expected return on I, hence its optimal level. If optimal Y falls, the probability 
of staying decreases, which reduces the expected return on I, hence its 
optimal level. The secondary effect of a change in the optimal level of Y 
may be relatively strong if Y is more sensitive to changes in the probability 
of exit and/or makes up a larger part of the individual’s investment portfolio 
than I. In such a case, the ultimate consequence of a change in the specificity 
of voice-related investment may turn out to be the opposite of the primary 
effect. Voice effort may ultimately fall (increase) even if the direct effect of 
changing specificity was positive (negative).
Voice-independent investment becomes less specific
To what extent are the effects on the probability of exit and the voice effort 
different if voice-independent (rather than voice-related) investment generates 
a higher return outside the existing relationship and the individual optimizes 
their investment levels?   
Primary effects
If voice-independent investment becomes more useful in the alternative 
relationship, there is no direct effect on the level or specificity of voice-related 
investment. Hence, the optimal level of voice effort does not change if one 
chooses to stay. The effect on the probability of exit is basically the same as in 
the previously examined case. Simply, Y must be substituted for I, and  s
Y
 for 
s
I
. Higher external usefulness makes exit more attractive, whereas an increase 
in the optimal level of investment has the opposite effect. The latter effect is 
stronger if 
Ys
Y
∂
∂
<
*
0
 
is greater. The probability of exit may increase or decrease, 
depending on the value Ys
Y
∂
∂ *
.
77HIRSCHMAN MEETS WILLIAMSON
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2012) 
Secondary effects
A change in the probability of exit indirectly modifies the expected return on 
voice-related investment and, as a consequence, its optimal level. Therefore, a 
fall in the specificity of voice-independent investment influences the optimal 
level of the other investment type. If the primary effect is an increase in the 
probability of exit, optimal I will fall. In the opposite case, it will rise. That 
is, as a secondary effect of Ys∆ , the optimal level of voice-related investment 
and, as a consequence, the voice effort if one stays may rise or fall (but is 
unlikely to remain unchanged). Like in the previously examined case, the 
sign of the primary and secondary effects on the probability of exit will be 
the same.
5. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
Loyalty can be defined as perseverance in a relationship in spite of 
difficulties. According to Hirschman, loyalty increases the cost of exit and 
may decrease the cost of voice. Hence, it makes exit less probable and voice 
efforts more worthwhile. I have argued that relation-specific investment 
provides one explanation for the emergence of loyal behaviour. The larger the 
investment, the greater the quasi-rent that would be lost in the case of exit. 
Moreover, some relationship-specific investments are voice-related. They 
raise the value of the relationship through voice activities: they increase the 
benefit from a given voice effort and thereby make voice more worthwhile.
When loyalty is (mainly) the result of relationship-specific investment, the 
emergence of loyalty can be traced back to changes in the social environment. 
The model presented explores such a mechanism. The starting point is an 
exogenous change in the homogeneity of relationships. Investments made 
in existing relationships become more useful in alternative relationships. 
Intuition suggests that weaker asset specificity leads to more frequent exit and 
less intensive voice activities. The model partly proves this intuition correct 
but exposes a more complex dynamic.
In the short run, the model shows that if investment becomes less specific 
due to an increase in external usefulness, the individual will indeed have a 
greater incentive to exit. However, his voice effort will not change because 
if he chooses to stay the return on voice-related investment will not change. 
This may seem to be an artefact of the model which assumes that voice effort 
is chosen after the exit/stay choice has been made. One may object that a 
change in the probability of exit would influence voice effort before the exit/
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stay decision. However, such an effect is considered in the long run version 
of the model in which voice-related investment is allowed to adjust to the 
probability of exit. One can think of voice-related investment to be voice 
effort intended to bring benefit in the long run.
The key difference between the short run and the long run is that the optimal 
level of specific investment may change. Under plausible assumptions, lower 
specificity will lead to an increase in the optimal level. First, a higher external 
return will increase the probability of exit and thereby the probability that part 
of the return will be lost. Hence, the effect on the optimal level of investment 
is negative. Second, a higher external return means that if the investor leaves 
for the alternative relationship, they will lose a smaller part of the return. 
Hence, this second effect on the optimal level of investment is positive. If 
the rate of return does not fall very rapidly as the level of investment rises, 
the net effect will be positive. The probability of exit will not increase to 
such an extent as to make it worthwhile to reduce the level of investment. 
A higher level of investment provides an incentive to stay because a higher 
investment implies a greater absolute loss of return in case of exit. In sum, 
the short run incentive to exit is counterbalanced (and may even be reversed) 
by a long term incentive to stay, which results from a higher optimal level of 
investment.
An important difference between voice-related and voice-independent 
investment is observed in the long run. Their direct effect on the voice effort 
when the individual has chosen to stay is different. The optimal level of voice 
effort in the existing relationship is only raised by an increase in voice-related 
investment, which makes effort more productive. However, a change in the 
specificity of voice-independent investment will have an indirect effect on the 
voice effort. It changes the probability of exit and thereby the expected return 
on voice-related investment, which determines the optimal voice effort in the 
existing relationship.
Our results show (somewhat paradoxically) that more homogeneity is 
likely to result in weaker loyalty in the short run but not necessarily in the 
long run. Higher external usefulness may increase the overall productivity of 
investment. The resulting higher optimal level of investment makes exit less 
attractive and, if voice-related, makes voice efforts more fruitful.
6. APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION
A possible application of the model to some major changes propelled 
by European integration can be briefly sketched (for elaboration, see Mike 
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2010). This process makes citizens’ investments less specific to their country. 
Thus, it affects their political activity (voice) as well as their migration (exit) 
choices. The model presented can help us understand these mechanisms. 
The distinctions between the short run and the long run and between voice-
related and other specific investments appear to be particularly important. 
The temporal distinction must be considered because it takes time for the 
level and composition of investments to adjust to changes in the environment. 
Therefore, European integration is likely to have different effects in the 
short and the long run. One of the main conclusions to be drawn from the 
model is that a weakening of loyalty and an increase in exit is to be expected 
primarily in the short run. In the long run, a growth in the overall level of 
investment by citizens may counterbalance the lower country-specificity of 
these investments that already appear in the short run. 
The model shows that the consequences of the integration process on 
national loyalty are far from certain. However, the conditions on which the 
signs of its effects on exit, voice and loyalty depend can be identified. One 
of the critical factors is the speed of adjustment in the level and composition 
of investments. The other factor is the degree of optimal adjustment. These 
factors could be the subject of empirical research in the future.
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